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Abstract— This paper assesses the possible use of constraints
to control the dissemination and use of location information (LI)
within a location based service architecture. The various types of
constraint which may by required are also considered. Finally,
issues and risks with the possible use of constraints are discussed,
as are possible solutions to these hazards.
I. INTRODUCTION
As devices used for wireless communication become in-
creasingly ubiquitous and mobile, it is becoming apparent
that location based services will play an important role in the
evolution of ambient networking. Location based services use
location information (LI) to allow an LI subject (the entity
concerning which LI is being created) or some other entity to
exploit this information to support the provision of one or more
services. These range from allowing an emergency service
to locate an LI subject, as is the case with E911 in North
America [1], to an authentication service based on the location
of an LI subject [2]. Location based services are also likely to
play a significant role as a vehicular technology [3], including
the support of navigational services and toll schemes.
Current technologies which may be used to generate LI
include various forms of Global Positioning System (GPS)
and Enhanced Observed Time Difference (EOTD) technolo-
gies [4]. GPS uses satellites to enable the calculation of the
LI of an LI subject. EOTD calculates LI by observing time
differences in transmissions between a user device and a base
station.
Unfortunately, LI may also be used for malicious purposes.
For example, an entity could use LI to stalk an LI subject.
Securing the privacy of LI is an issue which needs to be
addressed in order to gain the trust of the mass market for
such services. Intuitively, privacy of LI can only be gained
by limiting its distribution. This would mean that only those
authorised by the LI subject would be able to gain possession
of LI. With this in mind, this paper introduces LI constraints
as a means of allowing an LI subject to exert control over the
distribution of its LI. In the context of this paper, LI constraints
are simply rules associated with a specific piece or set of LI,
restricting the ways in which the associated LI may be used
and/or disseminated. To be effective, the constraints must be
bound to the associated LI, typically by cryptographic means
when the LI is in transit and by access control techniques for
stored LI.
LI constraints can be used to help manage the use and
distribution of LI. We investigate the possible constraint re-
quirements which an LI subject may have, and discuss how
these may be fulfilled. By looking at various uses for LI we
investigate restrictions which may be placed on these uses. We
look at the limitations which can be placed on the distribution
of LI and how responsibility might be determined when LI
constraints are abused. Constraints may also be placed on the
storage of LI, whereby an LI subject may be able to limit the
amount of time for which an entity can hold LI.
The limitations of using constraints to control LI are also
studied. Although constraints may allow an end user to have
some degree of control over its LI, placing constraints on LI
also allows an entity to gain additional knowledge about the
LI subject. For example, in order to place storage constraints
on LI, time stamps [5, p3] may be used to limit the length
of time that an entity is permitted to store the associated LI.
However, this mechanism also poses a risk, since placing a
time stamp on LI might allow receiving entities to learn the
time that the LI subject was at a particular location. We discuss
an alternative mechanism which involves recording the time at
which LI expires, instead of using a timestamp and duration.
Statements about where LI is not to be distributed give the
receiving entity knowledge about entities which the LI subject
may have an aversion to. Contrariwise, statements about where
LI can be distributed and ways in which it can be used may
also give information about services which an LI subject uses.
The paper concludes by looking at further work which may
aid the wider use of location based services. We discuss the
advantages of using a standardised language for describing
constraints and LI, and briefly look at a possible candidate for
such a language, namely XML.
II. A MODEL FOR THE USE OF LI
A. The roles
This section defines the entities involved in a location based
service architecture. It also describes the relationships between
the different entities. The entities and their relationships in the
special case of a mobile User Device are shown diagrammat-
ically in Figure 1.
• LI subject. An LI subject is the entity about whom
location information is being gathered, managed and
used. This entity is most commonly a human user.
• Malicious Party This is an entity with malicious intent.
A malicious party may act as a threat to the confiden-
tiality, integrity or availability of LI for one or more LI
subjects.
• User Device (UD). This entity is a device with which the
LI subject may interact, e.g. to invoke a location based
service. Such a device may either be static, e.g. a desk
top computer, or more typically mobile, such as a mobile
phone or Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). It is, in fact,
this device regarding which LI is generated rather than
the user him/herself, since there is typically no way to
directly measure the location of individuals. Thus this
entity is a key part of the model.
• Location Information (LI). This is data which provides
information regarding an LI subject’s location. LI may
occur in many forms. In general, we can divide LI into
two types, namely Inferred LI and Actual LI. Actual LI
refers to a directly calculated geographical location. This
type of data indicates, to some degree of accuracy, the
physical location of an LI subject. Inferred LI is, by
contrast, obtained by implication. For example, if a user is
present on a network, this implies that they are likely to be
within an certain vicinity, although no specific calculation
of geographical LI has taken place.
• LI gatherer. This is an entity which gathers or possesses
LI about an LI subject. A GPS receiver is an example
of an LI gatherer, as it obtains location data. An entity
in a GSM network which keeps signalling data for a UD
is also an example of a LI gatherer. Although a GSM
network does not normally pass on this LI (except in
certain special cases), it certainly possesses such infor-
mation, and could, in an appropriate environment, be a
valuable source of LI for commercial use.
• Location Based Service (LBS). This is a service based
on LI, e.g. a vehicular navigation service.
• LBS directory. This entity provides information regard-
ing LBSs which are available for use to a particular
user. The LBS directory may itself use LI regarding
the service consumer when providing the service. For
example, it may show a service requestor lists of LBS
providers providing information about particular types of
retail premises in the area of the requester.
• Network Entity. This is a component which provides
a network service to a UD. Two important types of
Network Entity are the local base station which provides
network access to the UD, and the UD’s ‘home network’
with whom the UD owner has a contract and charging
arrangement for the provision of network services.
• Regulator/Legal authority. This is an entity which ex-
erts legal or regulatory control over the management and
use of LI. This includes telecommunications regulators,
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Fig. 1. Mobile scenario for location-based service provision
B. LI abuse
This document discusses the use of constraints to limit the
abuse of LI. When we talk about the abuse of LI constraints,
we define this as any use, distribution or storage of LI which
contradicts the rules defined by the constraints. We also
assume that the LI, together with the constraints, is transmitted
and stored in a secure manner. By this we mean that the
receiving entity has been authenticated by the sender, that
LI confidentiality and integrity are not compromised during
transmission, and that the LI constraints are securely bound to
the LI.
III. USING CONSTRAINTS WITH LI
In order to set constraints on LI we must first look at how
an LI subject may want to restrict the use and distribution of
LI. In addition, these constraints should be in some common
format which is automatically processable.
A. Constraint types
This section looks at the types of LI constraint which may
be required.
1) Storage time constraints: Storage time constraints may
be used to limit the duration that an entity can store LI. This
can be done in two ways.
One way is by the use of time stamps. A time stamp can
be used to record the time of creation or the existence of
information [5, p3]. By adding a validity period a statement
can be made that an entity should not hold LI subsequent
to its expiry. For example, the LI subject may state that an
entity cannot use LI once one hour after the time set by
the time stamp has elapsed. The use of time stamps requires
additional security mechanisms. Time stamp protocols require
synchronisation and secure time clocks [5, p3]. Also, there
should be secure mechanisms to obtain them. The fields
needed for such a constraint would be the issue date/time and
the validity period.
Another way of adding time constraints to LI is by stating
the time at which LI expires. This may be in the form of a date
and time after which LI cannot be held. This would eliminate
the need for a secure time stamp. The entity receiving LI will,
however, need access to a secure clock in order to learn when
LI is invalid. The field necessary for this scheme would be the
expiry date/time.
2) Distribution constraints: The LI subject may also want
to constrain the distribution of LI. Distribution constraints can
be specified inclusively or exclusively. Inclusive constraints
would show the entities who are permitted to possess LI.
Exclusive constraints would show the entities who are not
permitted to possess LI.
Consideration should also be made with regard to the way
in which LI distribution is managed, and which entity is
accountable for misuse of LI. This could be the entity which
sends LI to an entity who is not permitted to receive it,
or it could be the entity which receives and then stores LI
when it is not permitted. Of course having both sender and
receiver responsible for protecting LI would be most desirable,
to ensure that the probability of misuse being prevented, or at
least detected, is maximised.
3) Usage constraints: An LI subject may want to place
constraints on the use of LI, to allow them to restrict the
way in which their LI is used. Difficulties when constraining
usage arise when attempting to enumerate all the different
applications of LI, because of the wide range of possible uses.
An attempt to classify the main possible uses of LI is given
in section III-B immediately below.
B. Uses of constraints
The use of LI can be divided into two main types. LI can
be used to:
• provide the LI subject with a service or with location
details, or
• provide a service or location details to a separate entity.
The LI subject may, of course, not wish other entities to
gain access to its location information, and hence may use
constraints to limit uses of LI falling into the second category.
Both these two main categories can be further sub-divided, and
we now consider some examples of uses of LI within these
two broad classes — see also Figure 2. These lists are not
meant to be exhaustive.
1) Providing services to the LI subject: We consider four
main categories of use of LI where the benefiting entity is the
LI subject.
• Location based security may be used to provide a security
service to the LI subject. For example, the LI subject
may not want to carry out transactions with retailers from
certain locations. The LI subject can check the location
of the retailer and use this information to decide whether
or not it wants to carry out a transaction.
• Location based messaging may be used to inform an
LI subject regarding any “buddies” who may be located
nearby. These buddies may be a list of people maintained
by the LI subject. This is similar to internet messaging
with the added location property. An LI subject may
not want “buddies” to know his/her location at a given
time, a restriction which can be supported by the use of
appropriate LI constraints.
• Navigation services are currently one of the most popular
proposed uses of LI. LI is used to locate the LI subject,
and information is provided according to their naviga-
tional needs. For example, the navigation service may
have information about nearby traffic congestion which
should be avoided. It may also plan a route which avoids
this traffic.
• Directory services may be used by the LI subject to find
local services. For example, LI may be used to help the
LI subject locate nearby restaurants.
• Other services may be provided to the LI subject, in-
cluding weather services, where weather information is
provided based on the LI subject’s location.
2) Providing services to other entities: We consider three
main categories of use of LI where the benefiting entity is not
the LI subject.
• Advertising based on location [6] is a potentially useful
tool for retailers. For example, as an LI subject is passing
a shop, messages about special offers may appear on
the user device. Of course, advertisements may not be
something that an LI subject wants; this is a problem
similar to junk mail. LI constraints could be employed
by the LI subject to prevent such a use being made of
LI.
• Location based security, as its name suggests, refers to
the provision of a security service based on the location of
the LI subject. In particular access and authentication [2]
may be provided based on the location of an LI subject.
An example of where this may be useful arises in the
context of wireless LANs. So called ‘war-driving’ attacks
allow unauthorised users to access a network from outside
the perimeter of a building [7]. A secure mechanism for
providing LI to the entity controlling the network would
prevent such attacks.
• Location based safety describes where, in an emergency,
details of an LI subject’s location is sent to the safety
entity so they can be located quickly and efficiently.
Although the LI subject may eventually be the beneficiary
of this service, its immediate use is by the emergency
service. In some countries, such as North America where
E911 is deployed [1], it may not be possible for an LI
subject to prevent its LI being used for this purpose.
• Other services that may be provided to entities other than
the LI subject include LI subject tracking. This enables
a range of possibilities, including allowing an employer
to track employees to efficiently manage resources, and
allowing a car-leasing company to track their cars.
If an LI subject wishes their LI to be used for one specific
purpose, the use of constraints allows this to be made clear.














Fig. 2. LI usage tree
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CONSTRAINTS
Once an entity other than the LI subject has possession of
LI, it is difficult to force them to abide by the constraints
which have been set.
A. Difficulties in preventing and detecting constraint abuse
As mentioned earlier, once an entity is in possession of LI
they are free to do with it as they will. LI is data, and the
constraints which may be set on it do not physically prevent
the receiving entity from misusing it. What adding constraints
does do, however, is to allow entities to know the wishes of
the LI subject. A regulatory authority which oversees the way
in which other entities handle constraints may go some way
towards preventing constraint abuse.
Another problem which arises when considering the use of
constraints is proving their abuse. We have already established
the difficulties of preventing the abuse of constraints with LI;
it is also difficult to prove an entity has abused LI.
B. LI constraint predicaments
The aim of using constraints with LI is to enable an LI
subject to dictate its use. Applying constraints to LI may,
however, lead to further security considerations.
When a user applies constraints to LI, they give information
which indicates how, or how not, to use the LI. Although
this information may be necessary to prevent the misuse of
LI, applying constraints means that further information is
divulged to the receiving entity. Two examples of this are now
discussed.
1) Time constraint predicament: Two potential schemes for
time constraints were mentioned in section III-A.1. One made
use of a validity period for the constraints. The other is where
the constraints are valid until a specified point in time.
The first scheme makes use of a time stamp which is added
to the constraint. This allows a receiving entity to calculate the
time at which a user was at the location shown by the LI. Of
course, in most cases, the entities who are likely to receive LI
are in all probability trusted by the LI subject, and so the fact
that they know that a user was at a location at a particular time
should not be a problem. The difference between this and the
second scheme for specifying time constraints is that, in the
latter case, a receiving entity is not informed precisely when
the LI subject was at a particular location. The delay before the
receiving entity obtains the LI may only allow an approximate
location of the LI subject to be calculated. However, in some
cases, LI may be used in real time and, in such cases, the
second scheme may be inadequate. An example may be for a
navigational service, where the location and movement of the
LI subject must be calculated in order to provide the required
information.
2) Distribution constraint predicament: If we place the
responsibility for enforcing the LI constraints on the receiver
of LI, then the presence of non-permitted LI at an entity is
evidence that this entity is not acting within the constraints
of the LI. Of course the problem with this is that it is not
possible to prevent an entity from redistributing LI which it is
not permitted to see.
V. COMBINING CONSTRAINTS WITH AUDITABILITY
Preventing misuse of LI is inevitably going to be a complex
task. For an entity to be able to use LI, they must have access
to it. After an entity has seen the LI, they thereafter can use
or misuse it as they please. Even when constraints are bound
to the LI, an entity may choose to ignore them or decide not
to pass them on.
Instead of trying to prevent misuse of LI, which is almost
certainly an impossible task, we therefore propose the concept
of auditability of LI. The idea is to enable all users of LI to
determine where LI originates from, and to make all users
accountable for their uses of LI. To work effectively, the
majority of LI users must abide by the auditability rules, but
this seems a reasonable assumption (otherwise there is little
hope of achieving any control over LI). Of course, auditing
will not prevent abuse, but it does enable misuse to be detected
after the event, thereby acting as a deterrent to misuse.
The notion of auditability introduced here requires use of
digital signatures. Every piece of LI, and its associated set
of LI constraints, must be accompanied by a digital signature
computed over both the LI and its constraints. That is, when
any LI is generated by an LI gatherer, then, as well as gen-
erating and attaching the LI constraints, the LI gatherer must
create a signature over the LI and the associated constraints.
The LI gatherer might also be required to include evidence
with the LI of how the LI was obtained, and include this
evidence within the scope of the signature.
Any entity receiving LI must verify the accompanying
signature, and must log an exception (and must not use the
LI) if the signature verification fails or if the signature is not
present. Moreover, all LI users must check the constraints
accompanying received LI to determine whether they should
be in receipt of the LI — again, if they are not then an
exception should be generated and the LI should not be used.
Finally, the LI and the signature should be retained for auditing
purposes for a specified period of time.
We now consider how this combination of rules can prevent
(or at least make more difficult) the mishandling of LI. First
observe that the mechanism described above does not address
the misuse of LI, i.e. the use of LI in ways prohibited
by the LI constraints. It is instead intended to address the
issue of unauthorised distribution of LI (after all, uncontrolled
dissemination of LI is probably the issue of greatest concern
to most LI subjects).
Suppose a malicious entity wishes to redistribute LI in a
way prohibited by the LI constraints. If the entity simply
sends it on as received, then the recipient will detect that the
constraints have been violated and the malicious entity can
be held responsible for the breach of constraints. Hence the
malicious entity will need to change the LI constraints. This,
however, will invalidate the original signature, and sending the
LI without a signature will also enable the recipient to detect
an LI use violation. Hence, if an entity wishes to disseminate
LI with modified constraints, then they must sign the LI and
indicate from where it was obtained — this may present a
major problem for a fraudulent LI user. It will at minimum
enable a subsequent audit to detect exactly which entity was
responsible for disseminating unauthorised LI.
A further measure to restrict the ability to fraudulently
disseminate LI would be to limit the entities capable of acting
as LI gatherers and generating signatures on LI. If a LI
gatherer required a licence (e.g. in the form of an attribute
certificate) to generate signed LI, then a malicious user without
such a licence could not falsely disseminate LI, except to other
malicious users.
Clearly this notion of auditability is dependent on industry
co-operation and a regulatory body to ensure that rules are
obeyed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
Although attaching constraints has the advantage of allow-
ing entities to see the requirements of the LI subject regarding
LI, in doing so it also allows them to see additional information
which may breach the privacy of the LI subject. It is also
difficult to ensure that entities abide by the constraints which
are set by the LI subject, and to prove when the constraints
have been abused. Finding ways to address such issues is an
important research challenge.
In order to enable a wide use of location based services it is
important to have a single language for the specification of LI.
This should allow LI to be generated, transferred and used on a
wide variety of platforms. Currently the most promising means
of achieving a universally recognised means of specifying LI
would be to employ an appropriately devised XML schema.
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a language for data
exchange between different devices. It allows data to be shared
regardless of programming language or operating system,
making it a strong candidate for use with location based
services and to describe LI. If LI is described in XML, it
should also be possible to describe constraints in XML, giving
similar advantages. XML can also be used to create digital
signatures, which may be used to support the auditing scheme
mentioned above.
Location is just one aspect of a context based service.
A context based service is one in which the context of an
application automatically initiates some activity. Examples of
possible contexts other than location include temperature and
special events. Of course different forms of context have
different security aspects. For example, the temperature of
a subject’s environment may not be private data; however,
the end user’s personal blood temperature may be private. As
with location information, it would be necessary to subject
such data to distribution and use constraints. This would mean
extending the constraints described here to different contexts.
Although this document identifies some of the constraints
which may be set by the LI subject, no formal language is
defined whereby constraints are verifiable and unambiguous.
Defining such a language may be a fruitful area for future
research.
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